Cybersecurity is one of most critical concerns for any organization, as frequency and severity of cyber attacks constantly increase, resulting in loss of vital assets and/or services. To preserve key security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability, a variety of defense techniques have been introduced. While intrusion detection system (IDS) has played a key role in cybersecurity for a long time, recently new proactive defense techniques, called intrusion prevention techniques, have emerged, aiming to resolve the known IDS limitations. The intrusion prevention techniques have been introduced to control actions of attackers as a proactive defense that can be deployed independently or combined with other defense techniques that have the purpose of achieving ''Defense in Breadth.'' In this work, we develop a probability model using Stochastic Petri Nets that describes an integrated defense system with the defense techniques of both intrusion detection (i.e., IDS) and intrusion prevention (i.e., honeypots and platform migration) and analyze its performance compared to single defense or partially integrated defense approaches. Our result shows that the integrated defense system outperforms the compared approaches by minimizing attack success while maximizing system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure). Further, we investigate the effect of the interplay between different defense techniques in terms of the defense cost and attack cost.
Introduction
Cybersecurity has been realized as one of the most critical operational concerns for any organization relying on computer networked systems. According to the recent Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report, 1,2 current protection techniques are known to be inadequate to address current and future threats. Furthermore, for about 75% of the attacks, it took more than seven days to discover them while the time to compromise a network was less than an hour for 82% of the cases. As such, the attacker has an obvious advantage over the defender in cyberspace. There have been many different efforts to develop innovative defense mechanisms to reverse this trend. Among them, deception and moving target defense (MTD) have been realized as one of the most prominent defense mechanisms. 3 This trend well represents the shift from the traditional reactive paradigm of detection and response (e.g., intrusion detection system, namely IDS) into a more proactive approach aiming to prevent intrusions by controlling the courses of an attacker's actions before the attacker performs any malicious activities.
Cybersecurity cannot be achieved or maintained by a single, silver-bullet solution. Instead, there is a need for a collection of defense techniques that can work together and complete one another to deal with sophisticated attacks. This type of defense is termed as Defense in Breadth, which refers to the defense based on multiple mechanisms across sophisticated multiple attack classes.
Furthermore, it becomes challenging to formalize the trade-offs between security and performance or costeffective productivity. In the literature, little has been discussed on the inter-dependencies between security techniques in Defense in Breadth, especially with respect to deception and MTD. Each of these defensive techniques is developed and evaluated independently. Integrating both deception and MTD into one system can achieve a cyberdefense solution that maximizes security and performance. 4 In this work, we are interested in how an integrated defense system equipped with IDS, deception, and MTD can best perform based on the interplay between different defense techniques. For example, a system with IDS may suffer from a high volume of false alarms (i.e., false positives) or undetected attacks (i.e., false negatives). In addition, MTD such as platform migration may incur high deployment costs although it is more robust against the attacks in a security sense compared to other techniques such as IDS (e.g., generating false positives or false negatives) or deception techniques (e.g., being detected by an attacker). Deception techniques are favored when cost is an issue or if temporary delay of an attack can provide high benefits to a system (e.g., need to delay the attacker's penetration into the system until MTD is deployed). In addition, IDS is also useful when deception or MTD techniques cannot prevent intrusions due to performance degradation, deployment overhead or highly intelligent attackers that easily detect the deception. However, the attacker can hide from IDS by performing random attacks, rather than persistent attacks which tend to be easily detected by IDS due to their consistent patterns. That is, each defense mechanism has a respective strength and weakness which can be complemented when multiple defense techniques are well integrated with the goal of achieving secure defense against attacks as well as lightweighted defense.
In this work, we aim to model a defense system integrated with three defense mechanisms: IDS, deception, and MTD. Based on the developed model, we evaluate the performance of the integrated defense system by comparing them against a single defense mechanism or partially combined defense mechanisms. To be specific, this work has the following key contributions.
1. This work is the first to investigate performance of a system that integrates three defense techniques, IDS, deception, and MTD. While taking the perspectives of both the attacker and defender, we analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of the techniques in different levels of integration (i.e., individual, partially combined, and all together). 2. We develop a Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) model in which the underlying mode is Markov or semiMarkov 5 in order to evaluate the performance of a cyber security system that utilizes IDS, deception, and/or MTD. We use attack cost and attack success probability to measure the attacker's performance while using the defense cost and system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure, namely MTTSF) to estimate the defender's performance. MTTSF is a new metric derived from the traditional reliability metric but considers the security failure as the system failure condition in terms of an attacker's success. 3. We compare four variants of the defense systems:
IDS only, IDS with deception, IDS with MTD, and IDS with both deception and MTD. For the purpose of this work, any defense system with more than one security mechanism is considered as an integrated defense system. The last scheme with three techniques is considered the most broad and integrated defense system examined in this work. We conduct comprehensive comparative performance analysis through the evaluation of the developed SPN model in this work.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the concepts and existing work related to the techniques of reconnaissance defense, intrusion detection (i.e., IDS), and intrusion prevention (i.e., deception and MTD). Section 3 describes the attack and defense behaviors modeled in this work. Section 4 shows the SPN developed to evaluate the integrated defense mechanism and gives the performance metrics used for the experimental evaluation. Section 5 shows the experimental results and provides the interpretation of the overall trends observed in the results. Section 6 summarizes the results and suggests the future research directions.
Related work
In this section, we give an overview of the concepts of existing defense mechanisms used in this work, including the reconnaissance defense, and intrusion detection (i.e., IDS) and intrusion prevention techniques (i.e., deception and MTD).
Reconnaissance defense
The Cyber Kill Chain model has been commonly used to describe the different phases of a cyber attack. 6 The model illustrates the linear progression of the attacker with the following phases: Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command & Control, and Actions on Objectives. Deception and MTD (see Section 2.3) can be used effectively in each of the phases separately and/or independently. Stech et al. 7 and Okhravi et al. 8 review the usefulness of different deception and MTD techniques as an attack progresses in the Cyber Kill Chain model. For example, deception, as a defense mechanism, can utilize computers that store falsified data (i.e., honeypots) or employ MTD that changes computer memory layout dynamically (i.e., Address Space Randomization) during the Exploitation phase. 4, 8 Reconnaissance is vital for attackers to identify critical targets and collect useful information (e.g., host's operation system (OS) type and IP address) in order to move towards the Weaponization and Delivery phases. 4, 8 Sophisticated attackers tend to spend an extensive amount of resources (e.g., time) during the Reconnaissance phase as the subsequent attack stages are heavily dependent upon the amount and quality of the collected information. Many deception and MTD techniques are more likely to target hurdling the attacker's Reconnaissance phase by making the attacker's information collection highly challenging. Deception aims to mislead the attacker to waste their time and effort in developing an ineffective exploitation based on collected information. On the other hand, many MTD techniques build upon changing attack surfaces of a system, requiring a tremendous amount of time for the attacker to collect information on new system configurations as the information collected in the past on the previous system configurations quickly become outdated. 4, 8 A system can deploy different defense techniques to mitigate adversarial reconnaissance.
Intrusion detection
IDS is a well-known tool for security analysts to detect network intrusions and network misuse by matching patterns of known attacks against ongoing network activity. For example, an attacker can perform port scanning to discover hosts' vulnerabilities, as a reconnaissance technique. 12 Defenders can use IDS to detect port scanning before the attacker manages to achieve a foothold in the target. Further, IDS can be used to detect attacks as an attacker progresses in the Cyber Kill Chain, like communication from a compromised machine to its controlling server. Once IDS finds a match to a known attack type or detects abnormal network activity, it produces alerts with detailed description of the suspicious activities. 13 However, IDS-based defense has been known for the following limitations: (1) a high volume of false alarms that can increase with the sensitivity of the IDS rule set along with the ever-growing number and complexity of cyber-attacks 14 ; (2) little effect on intrusion prevention or protection; and (3) limited capability to capture real-time or encrypted malicious traffic contributing to a high volume of false negatives (i.e., missing attack behaviors diagnosed as benign). 15, 16 
Intrusion prevention
In this section, we discuss deception and MTD as intrusion prevention techniques which are considered for the proposed integrated defense system. 2.3.1. Deception. Traditionally, military deception is defined as actions executed to deliberately mislead an attacker's decision related to military capabilities (i.e., strengths and weaknesses), intentions, and operations. Deception is designed to impact the attacker's behavior in a desired way contributing to accomplishing a defender's mission. 17 This approach can be applicable in any level of the interactions between an attacker and a defender across a wide spectrum of conflicts. Furthermore, a deception strategy, when conducted appropriately in a given context, is useful in any aspect of a military operation, leading to deceiving a decision maker to significantly change a given situation. 17 Deception can take two forms: hiding the real and showing the false. Deception aims to manipulate the quality of information available to the attacker by deliberately presenting misleading information. In addition, deception can provide the attacker with a false sense of having complete information or lead the attacker to misjudge relevance of information. 1, 9 Caddell 10 uses a similar approach to categorize deception as passive versus active. Passive deception refers to the act of hiding capabilities and intentions from the adversary while active deception indicates constructing false beliefs through falsified information or evidence.
Similarly, Daniel and Herbig 11 introduce ambiguity increasing to increase uncertainty or confusion to attackers and misleading variety to mislead the attackers, corresponding to the above categories, respectively. The ambiguity increasing resembles the underlying idea of MTD.
Some deception techniques dissimulate information to hide the real while other techniques simulate information to create false beliefs. Dissimulating deception can be achieved by the following techniques. 1, 9 • Masking: Hide a specific vulnerable service when an attacker's malicious scan is detected.
• Repackaging: Make a vulnerability look like something else. For example, a defender creates HoneyFiles 18 by making trap files look like regular files.
• Dazzling: Increase confusion by leading an attacker to confuse in discerning whether information is true or false.
Simulating deception can be conducted with the following three techniques. In Table 1 , we summarize the various categorizations of deception techniques discussed in the literature.
Although deception techniques have been used to mitigate the strength of attacks by either confusing or misleading attackers, their limitations have been discussed as follows. 1, 19 • Deception can fail to achieve an intended result if not implemented correctly by the defender or detected by the attacker. For example, the defender's effort and investment determine the resemblance between honeypots and real targets. Similarly, the attacker can invest varying amounts of resources to determine whether a possible target is a honeypot or not.
• Deception incurs cost and a decision to conduct deception requires a trade-off analysis between security and performance of a system. For example, extensive repackaging can slow down network traffic and breakdown connectivity.
• Deception is more likely to be detected by an attacker over time as the attacker experiences more deceptions over time. A defender should maximize the use of deception by limiting its effective time window before the attacker detects the deception.
• An attacker can leverage the knowledge of detected deceptions as part of a ''hypercon'' or ''counterdeception'' attack against a defender.
Moving target defense.
Defenders may want to change the attack surface continuously to create and increase uncertainty for an attacker, which may require increasing the attacker's effort (namely cost and time) to launch a successful attack. 20 The type of defense techniques is called MTD. By increasing dynamic, heterogeneous, and non-deterministic system configurations, MTD requires more workload by an attacker aiming to penetrate into a system and minimizes the time window in which a vulnerability is exploitable by the attacker. Through the randomization of different aspects of the system, MTD reduces the likelihood of a successful attack, minimizes the foothold obtained by the attacker, and mitigates the damage from large-scale and persistent attacks. 21 The frequent changes of the attack surface increase the attacker's uncertainty towards the features of the target and make it more difficult for an attacker to identify and exploit system vulnerabilities. There has been a growing number of MTD approaches, embracing machine-level techniques such as address space or instruction set randomization, network-level techniques such as port, address hopping or software defined networking, and system-level techniques such as service or platform migration. 22 MTD techniques have been characterized by several existing works based on the key characteristics. 21, 23 Hong and Kim 23 categorize the MTD techniques in terms of Shuffling, Diversity, and Redundancy. Shuffling refers to the rearrangement of system settings such as changing IP in a software defined network (SDN) at a TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol) layer or changing the duration/availability of Virtual Machine live migration. Diversity deploys different implementations for equivalent functionalities such as path diversification for routing or changes in the implementation of software components or migrations between different platforms (i.e, software stacks and hardware). Redundancy increases system reliability by producing multiple replications of network components such as path or software redundancy at a network or application layer, respectively.
Okhravi et al. 21 classify MTD techniques based on the application domains, including Dynamic networks, Dynamic platforms, Dynamic runtime environments, Dynamic software, and Dynamic data. Some, like Dynamic networks, are more effective during a specific phase in the Cyber Kill Chain (i.e., Reconnaissance), while Dynamic platforms techniques like platform diversity, can be effective in almost every phase of the attack model.
Platform migration is one of the prominent MTD techniques that entail changing the software stack of a system through virtualization, consequently changing system properties. Properties can range from high to low including system architecture, operating system, or kernel version among others. Migration can also change low-level properties such as the address space layout and the direction of the stack. 22 The migration between platforms can be an effective reconnaissance defense because the information collected by the attacker cannot be exploitable once the defender migrated. Furthermore, migration can wipe all progress made by the attacker out, similar to proactive restart as a cyber maneuver to increase attack resilience. 24 The effectiveness and efficiency of different platform migration strategies have been investigated with respect to the characteristics of an attack such as target exploitability or the attack phase such as reconnaissance. 20, 25 While MTD provides a wide range of techniques to mitigate a wide range of cyber attacks, some limitations have been discussed in the literature as follows.
• There is a need to choose the appropriate MTD technique to mitigate a specific attack type. This can happen when the attacker finds an exploit that does not depend on properties changed by MTD.
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• Some MTD techniques are better at disrupting the attacker compared to others, depending on the attacker's goal which is often unknown. For example, platform migration can be very effective when the attacker aims to maintain a foothold in the system for a long time. However, it might be less effective in preventing the initial penetration to the system.
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• The use of MTD incurs cost associated with system performance affecting service availability or computational performance and/or network connectivity. For example, SDN can be used as an MTD technique but may significantly slow down network connectivity. 3 Although performance of a single defense mechanism (i.e., IDS, deception, or MTD) 18, 23, 26, 27 or partially combined mechanisms 28 have been evaluated through modeling and simulation techniques, the performance of an integrated defense system based on the interplay between different defense techniques has not been investigated in the existing state-of-art studies.
System model
We concern a system consisting of multiple components such as multiple computers in a networked system. We assume that a certain percentage of the computers exhibits security vulnerabilities while others do not. We shortly name a vulnerable node as a VN while calling a nonvulnerable node as a NVN. We model these nodes based on the probability that a given node is vulnerable or not vulnerable, denoted by P v and 1 À P v , respectively.
Attack model
In this work, an attacker is assumed to exhibit the following behaviors.
• The attacker has a finite set of exploits and P v is a function of the match between the attacker's exploits and the software stack on the target nodes.
• An attacker can detect whether a given node in a system of interest has vulnerability or not with perfect knowledge. That is, when the attacker accesses a certain node in the system, it knows whether the accessed node is exploitable to disrupt the system, which can potentially result in the system failure.
• An attacker is characterized by the probability of detecting the deception deployed in a given node, denoted by P ad .
• An attacker can learn from its past experiences including failure experiences where it was detected by IDS, deceived by a honeypot (i.e., a deception technique), or confused by MTD. The attacker becomes smarter based on this learning (i.e., previous attack failure experiences), leading to expediting the attack success (i.e., shortening the time to reach the system failure).
• An attacker may take more time to investigate system configurations if a defender deploys MTD in a given VN. For example, if MTD is used, during the reconnaissance period the attacker has to spend a significantly more time to identify the target's new configurations, compared to situations where MTD is not used. Extending the reconnaissance period not only drains the attacker's resources, but also allows IDS to earn additional time to detect the attacker before the attack can progress.
The above attack behaviors are modeled using the probability of detecting deception by an attacker, denoted P ad in the SPN illustrated in Figure 1 .
In this work, we assume that if a single VN is compromised and exploited by an attacker, then the entire system fails. For example, when nodes in the system are communicated in a networked environment, they use a symmetric key for secure group communication. In this network, when a single node is compromised and its group key is captured by the attacker (i.e., exploited), the entire system will be compromised. Thus, we use this hard security condition to evaluate the proposed integrated defense system equipped with IDS, deception, and MTD.
Defense model
In this work, we consider three types of defense mechanisms as the key components of the proposed integrated defense system as follows.
• IDS: A given node has IDS installed, so-called a host-based IDS, 26 which was used by a distributed system where each node needs to detect malicious activities by the attacker. In this work, IDS will be triggered with a certain interval but adaptively in proportion to detected attacks, reflecting IDS's learning towards attacks exhibited in the past. IDS can take advantage of MTD by earning extra time to detect attackers before a successful attack is attained. Note that MTD using platform migration requires an attacker to recollect information towards system new configurations. Furthermore, the host-based IDS installed in each node is characterized by detection errors, generating false positives (i.e., detecting benign nodes as compromised) and false negatives (i.e., detecting malign nodes as benign). Since our model focuses on whether a given attacker is detected as good (i.e., false negatives) or bad (i.e., true negatives), we consider the true negative based on 1 À P fn to represent the true negatives in IDS of the SPN model (see Figure 1 ).
• Deception: A ''honeypot'' technique is used by a defender with the goal of misleading an attacker to believe that an isolated and highly monitored node is a high quality target that is worth attacking 29 . This honeypot technique has the following benefits: (1) no harm is done to the defender system; (2) it does not provide any gain to the attacker; and (3) the attacker activity is observed by the defender which can obtain extra signatures of malicious activities from the observations. However, the effectiveness of this deception technique is significantly affected by the attacker's ability to detect the deception, which was considered as the part of an attacker's behavior, denoted by P ad , referring to deception detectability.
• MTD: Platform migration, one of the diversity techniques in MTD, is used to conduct MTD. 25, 30 This is costly compared to light-weighted manipulation of environmental settings such as Shuffling (e.g., changing an IP address) to cause confusion to an attacker. However, since this platform migration introduces a lot more new configurations the attackers need to investigate or figure out, it is more effective than a deception technique which may be detected by the attacker over time, as discussed in Section 2.
In terms of the cost of a defense technique, MTD is the most expensive defense technique among three techniques (i.e., IDS, deception, and MTD). The key components that introduce additional cost to execute the platform migration are: (1) it may decrease system performance due to migration itself; (2) there is a need to hide the migration from the attacker; and (3) using different configurations may reduce efficiency of system operation in a given mission. However, platform migration is a very effective defense mechanism for a security perspective, exhibiting efficiency-effectiveness trades. We model IDS and deception as an equal cost while MTD costs twice of IDS or deception, to reflect the high cost paid to deploy MTD.
Performance model 4.1. Stochastic Petri Nets
To develop a probability model describing the behaviors of attackers and defenders in this work, we use a SPN model in which the underlying mode is Markov or semiMarkov. 5 We use SPN Package version 6 which is developed by Duke University and available in Trivedi. 31 In this section, we present the developed SPN to evaluate the performance of a system integrated with different defense mechanisms (i.e., IDS, deception, and MTD). To provide basic knowledge on how an SPN works, we explain how a system state is described in the SPN. In an SPN, an oval is called a ''place'' indicating the system state when a particular event occurs. When the place has a token, it implies that the system is in a particular state. We also find a black bar called ''Transition'' which refers to a transition rate a system changes from one state to another. This can be translated to how much time taken for a particular event to occur. Note that the notation mark(place name) indicates the number of tokens in a particular place, place name.
In Figure 1 , we describe the developed SPN that models the interactions between an attacker and a defender as follows.
Access by an attacker: An attacker can access the system with the rate T ACCESS, defined by 1=T a where T a is the inter-arrival time of triggering the access event by an attacker. This models a situation as follows: The attacker is aware of the defender's address space. Within this address space, there are vulnerable and non-vulnerable machines. Thus, the attacker may encounter either a VN or a NVN with P v representing the probability that the attacker accesses the VN and (1 À P v ) referring to the probability that the attacker accesses the NVN. When the attacker accesses the VN, the place V N has a token. On the other hand, when the attacker accesses the NVN, the place NV N has a token. Since the attacker does not have an appropriate exploitability for the NVN, it will lead to the attack failure, which increases the number of tokens in the place AF by one with the rate T ATK F. Note that mark(AF) captures the accumulated attack failures by attackers.
Reconnaissance: When the attacker encounters the VN by having a token in the place V N, it can face either the RECON stage or the DCVD CGT stage. The place RECON indicates the state that the attacker is in, conducting reconnaissance, monitoring, and investigating the target system into which there is intention to penetrate (i.e., the VN it accessed).
Defense by deception: The place DCVD CGT is the system state that indicates that the attacker is deceived by the deception technique (i.e., a honeypot placed in the VN) or detected by IDS placed in the VN. We will describe T DET to trigger IDS later after describing MTD and attack failure event as it is associated with those events. The attacker can be deceived by the deception (i.e., a honeypot) with the rate T DCVD resulting in a token in the place DCVD CGT. Note that T DCVD is only triggered when the place HP (Honeypot) has a token implying the VN has a honeypot to deceive the attacker. HP will have a token when the transition T HP is triggered with the rate P h =T h where P h is the probability that a VN has a honeypot and T h is the inter-arrival time of this event, placing a honeypot in a given VN. When a new attack by an attacker arrives by enabling the transition T ACCESS, a token in place HP is taken out by the transition T NEXT with the same rate of T ACCESS as the completion of operations associated with a given VN.
Attack failure due to deception: After the attacker is deceived by the honeypot (i.e., the place HP has a token), it will ultimately lead to the attack failure, having a token in the place AF with the rate 1=T f in the transition T ATK F where T f is the inter-arrival time of diagnosing the attack failure by a defender (i.e., caught by IDS or no access to any vulnerable states of a system by an attacker).
Attacker's deception detectability: Whether to trigger T RECON or T DCVD is affected by the attacker's ability to detect that a VN is actually a honeypot placed by the defender. We model this deception detectability by the attacker with the probability P ad . We set the rate of the transitions of T RECON and T DCVD to P ad =T r and (1 À P ad )=T c where T r and T c are the inter-arrival times of each event, respectively.
Defense by MTD: The system can also defend against attackers using MTD. This is modeled by having the place MTD obtain a token with the rate P m =T m in the transition T MTD where P m is the probability that MTD is executed and T m is the corresponding inter-arrival time of triggering MTD, respectively. We also consider the interplay between MTD and IDS or attack success as follows. Whether the system executes platform migration or not can be associated with how much time the attacker has to stay in the state of the reconnaissance (i.e., the duration the place RECON has a token). This in turn influences the detectability of the attacker by IDS. If MTD is executed, IDS can have more time to detect attackers based on their suspicious activities during their prolonged reconnaissance period, leading to higher attack detection rates. At the same time, the attack success can be delayed by MTD which requires the attacker to invest further resources when gathering information towards new platform configurations. Similar to taking tokens out from HP by the transition T NEXT , when a new scan by an attacker arrives by enabling the transition T ACCESS, a token in place MTD is taken out by the transition T NEXT.
Defense by IDS: We also introduce adaptive detection by IDS based on the amount of attacks the system has experience at time t. Similarly we use adaptive attack by the attacker based on the amount of failed attacks the attacker has experience at time t. This models the learning by both attackers and defenders based on the past interactions between attackers and defenders. In addition, we consider the effect of MTD which will allow a defender to earn enough time to observe an attacker's activities investigating new system configurations. Therefore, the transition T DET is set with the rate (mark(AF) + mark(MTD) + 1)(1 À P fn )=T d where mark(AF) is the number of failed attacks due to IDS, MTD, or honeypots. mark(MTD) is the number of tokens in MTD (i.e., 0 for no MTD while 1 for MTD on execution), P fn is the probability of false negatives by IDS, and T d is the inter-arrival time of the detection event.
Attack success: Similarly, the transition T ATK S is triggered with the rate (mark(AF) + 1)=(T s (1 + mark(MTD))) where T s is the inter-arrival time of occurring an attacker's success. The formulation of T ATK S implies that the attacker learns based on the past failure experiences (i.e., mark(AF)) but its additional effort is required upon the execution of MTD.
Metrics
We use four performance metrics in which two metrics measure the attack performance while the other two metrics estimate the defense performance, respectively. The four metrics are obtained based on the reward functions assigned to the system states in the SPN. The performance metrics are computed based on the reward functions as follows:
• MTTSF: This metric refers to the system life time indicating how long the system will prolong until the security failure occurs (i.e., when mark(AS) = 1, the security failure occurs), and is given by:
where S denotes the set of all states, r i (reward) is 1 for the absorbing states having mark(AS) = 0 and 0 for mark(AS) = 1, and P i (t) is the probability of state i at time t.
• Accumulated defense cost (C D ): This metric measures how much defense cost is given to achieve MTTSF under a given defense system. Note that we consider the relative weight for each defense mechanism by counting the effort for HP and IDS equally while MTD is given twice the effort made to HP and IDS, which is applied in a reward function used in this metric. C D is computed by:
where S denotes the set of all states i where D i (reward) is given mark(HP) + 2 × mark(MTD) + mark(DCVD CGT), and P i (t) is the probability of state i at time t.
• Attack success probability (P AS ): Assuming that the system will fail when any one of VNs is compromised by an attacker, P AS is defined by:
where S denotes the set of all states i's, SF i (reward) is set to 1 for mark(AS) = 1 or 0 for mark(AS) = 0, and P i (t) is the probability of state i at time t.
• Accumulated attack cost (C A ): This metric measures the accumulated time an attacker invested until it succeeds its attack by having mark(AS) = 1, and is computed by:
where S denotes the set of all states, C i (reward) is set to mark(RECON ) + mark(DCVD CGT), and P i (t) is the probability of state i at time t.
In addition to these metrics, we will also demonstrate attack or defense cost per performance, the so-called attack unit cost or defense unit cost. They represent how much cost is paid to achieve given performance. That is, attack cost per attack success probability, C A =P AS , and defense cost per MTTSF, C D =MTTSF, are considered to show a unit cost for attack or defense performance, respectively. Note that a lower unit cost is more desirable in terms of the perspective of each party, an attacker, or a defender.
Numerical results and analyses
In this section, we give the experimental setup used to evaluate our developed SPN and explain what defense systems are compared against it for the comparative performance analyses. Finally, we show our experimental results and discuss the underlying reasons of the overall trends observed in the results.
Comparing schemes
In this work, we will compare the following four schemes.
• IDS only: This scheme provides ''IDS only'' to defend against attackers in the system. In our SPN shown in Figure 1 , the probabilities that MTD or a honeypot is placed on a node accessed by an attacker will be set to zero (i.e., P m = 0 and P h = 0), disabling the transitions T HP and T MTD.
• IDS + HP: This scheme considers the system with ''IDS and deception'' in which a honeypot can be placed when an attacker accesses a VN in a targeted system. We set P m = 0, disabling the transition T MTD while P h > 0 in the SPN.
• IDS + MTD: This scheme defends against an attacker with ''IDS and MTD'' in which MTD is placed when the attacker accesses a VN in a targeted system. We set P h = 0, disabling the transition T HP in the SPN.
• IDS + MTD + HP: This scheme indicates a defense system equipped with three defense mechanisms including ''IDS, MTD, and HP'' when an attacker accesses a VN. This is realized with P m > 0 and P h > 0 in the SPN.
Experimental setup
For the experiment, we consider a computer networked system consisting of N nodes set to 200, representing a network of a mid-sized organization. Each node is either a VN or a NVN based on a given vulnerability probability, P v , implying the number of NVNs is (1 À P v )N while the number of VNs is P v N . We fix the P ad = 0:5 as an attacker's ability to detect a deception. We also set the probabilities that a honeypot or MTD is placed, respectively. Table 2 summarizes the key design parameters, their meanings, and their default values used for this experiment. The design parameter values used in this experiment reflect a particular system condition where attackers exhibit a series of behaviors following the given set of event triggering time, which is modeled by the transition rates. A different set of design parameter values can reflect a different system condition and performance requirement to maintain. When varying the event transition times and probabilities to adjust the behaviors of attackers and defenders, we observe that the overall behavior across times remain the same while the evolution of system behavior changes to some extent with respect to time. Therefore, the presented results provide sufficient insights for the overall behaviors of the proposed defense system and its impact on defense performance against attack behaviors. We summarize the transition rates and their meaning along with the corresponding conditions that each transition is enabled in Table 3 .
Comparative performance analyses
In this work, we evaluate the SPN developed in Figure 1 based on the four performance metrics. In addition, to examine how efficiently each party achieves its goal, we also show a unit cost such as attack cost per attack success and defense cost per MTTSF.
Attack performance: In Figure 2 , we show the attack performance under the four defense systems in terms of attack success probability (Figure 2(a) ), attack cost ( Figure  2(b) ), and attack unit cost (Figure 2(c) ). When system vulnerability is high (i.e., P v is high), it implies that more nodes are perceived as vulnerable by an attacker, and viceversa. This means that the system is more robust with lower P v .
In Figure 2 (a), we compare the attack success probability based on Equation (3) of the four schemes. Overall, all schemes allow higher attack success as P v becomes higher. Noticeably, a higher increase of attack success is observed between P v = 0:3 and P v = 0:4 than when P v > 0:4. When there are more VNs compared to NVNs, it is more likely for the attacker to perform a successful attack due to a higher chance to compromise a VN. When the defender is using IDS only, all attacks on NVs arrive directly at the RECON state. From this state, if the attack is not detected by IDS, the attack success is achieved. If a system with IDS only wants to increase a detection rate without introducing any other defense techniques, it can use a shorter time interval to more frequently trigger detection The probability that a given vulnerable node(VN) has a honeypot 0.5
The probability MTD is in execution 0.5
The probability that the attacker detects deception by a defender 0.5 P fn
The probability that IDS falsely detect an attacker's malign behavior as benign 0.05
The inter-arrival time that a honeypot is placed in a given node 5 hrs.
T m
The inter-arrival time that MTD is triggered 5 hrs.
T r
The inter-arrival time that an attacker performs 'reconnaissance' 1 hr.
T a
The inter-arrival time that an attacker accesses a given node 5 hrs.
T s
The inter-arrival time that an attacker attains its success 3 hrs.
T c
The inter-arrival time that an attacker is deceived by a defender's deception 1 hr.
T f
The inter-arrival time that an attacker fails its attack goal 3 hrs.
T d
The inter-arrival time that IDS is triggered 3 hrs.
IDS: intrusion detection system; MTD: moving target defense.
operations, leading to higher costs associated with it (e.g., rekeying a group key and distributing the new key to all nodes in a given system). In terms of attack success probability, we can observe that the attacker's performance is in the order of IDS + MTD + HP < IDS + MTD < IDS + HP < IDS only. This implies that in terms of a defender's perspective, the integrated defense mechanism (i.e., IDS + MTD + HP) shows the minimum attack success probability, showing the highest security among the four schemes. In Figure 2 (b), we examine the performance of the four defense techniques with respect to the accumulated attack cost based on Equation (2) . Although the performance is quite similar to Figure 2(a) , we notice that the highest attack success does not necessarily require the highest attack cost. For example, the cost of IDS + MTD is the highest while the cost of IDS + MTD + HP is the second highest. This is because IDS + MTD + HP balances defense workload among three techniques where MTD costs higher than IDS or HP. In this work, we consider MTD incurring twice as much as IDS or HP costs. Therefore, instead of using MTD with high cost (but with high security), the use of HP reduces the overall defense cost although it provides less security than MTD as an attacker is more capable of detecting the honeypot as a deception technique.
In Figure 2 (c), we use the attack cost per attack success to examine how efficiently an attacker performs attacks under the four defense schemes. Due to the lowest attack success under IDS + MTD + HP, the attack unit cost is highest under IDS + MTD + HP among all, implying that the attacker is required to make the highest effort. The second highest attack unit cost is incurred when the defender is using MTD which requires additional efforts for the attacker to resolve new system configurations. It is also interesting to see that the attacker's cost per success is less sensitive to the system vulnerability when the defender is using IDS only and IDS + HP compared to IDS + MTD and IDS + MTD + HP.
Defense performance: In Figure 3 , we show the performance of the four defense systems when system vulnerability varies in terms of the system lifetime based on the security failure, MTTSF (Figure 3(a) ), defense cost ( Figure  3(b) ), and defense unit cost (Figure 3(c) ). Figure 3(a) shows MTTSF of the four schemes with respect to varying system vulnerability (P v ). As attack success probability has a high increase between P v = 0:3 and P v = 0:4, we can notice its impact on MTTSF, showing its high decrease in the same setting. In addition, we observe the expected trend that MTTSF decreases as P v increases. The performance of the four schemes is ordered as follows: IDS + MTD + HP > IDS + MTD > IDS + HP > IDS only. This is a reverse order of Figure 2 (a) and is true for a defender's perspective. In particular, introducing HP provides quite high performance compared to IDS Only but incurs much less cost than MTD. Figure 3(b) shows the defense cost of the four systems under varying P v . As expected, the highest cost is incurred under IDS + MTD + HP among all. In addition, we can notify that MTD is costly compared to HP (i.e., deception using a honeypot) because MTD, such as a platform migration, requires much more cost than deploying a deception. However, MTD achieves a much higher level of security than HP, showing lower attack success in MTD than HP, as shown in Figure 2(a) .
In Figure 3 (c), we investigate the performance of the four defense schemes in terms of the defense unit cost. Since the integrated defense technique (i.e., IDS + MTD + HP) achieves the highest MTTSF, the unit defense cost is also the highest among all. Notice that introducing a deception technique (i.e., a honeypot) costs significantly more than using IDS only while it significantly increases MTTSF (i.e., more than 25%) in IDS + HP than in IDS only. However, integrating a deception technique on top of IDS + MTD (i.e., IDS + MTD + HP) adds a little more cost compared to the cost in IDS + MTD and accordingly increases MTTSF at least more than 5%. This reveals that the integrated defense system can add different defense techniques to enhance security without introducing a significant cost, leading to more effectively dealing with sophisticated attacks. In this experiment, we fixed P ad = 0:5 (an attacker's ability to detect a deception), P h = 0:5 (the probability of using a honeypot), and P m = 0:5 (the probability of using MTD). In terms of a defender's perspective, it is critical to identify an optimal setting, including optimal use of deception and MTD techniques that minimizes defense cost but maximizes MTTSF. We leave this sensitivity analysis to the future work.
Interestingly as observed in Figure 2 (b) and Figure  3 (b), our SPN model captures the higher defense cost than the attack cost. The clear gap in the cost associated with launching malicious activities by an attacker and defending against the attacker looks realistic based on the overall trends of most cyber attack-defense situations. That is, the technical knowledge and amount of resources required to initiate a cyber attack decrease continuously while the defender's costs to deal with the attacks increase steadily by deploying additional defense based on multiple defense techniques. 
Conclusion and future work
In this work, we modeled an integrated defense system considering the concept of the defense in breadth where both intrusion detection and prevention techniques are incorporated into the defense system. Given a network of computers, the developed SPN model allowed us to evaluate the performance of different combinations of defense techniques from the perspectives of both a defender and an attacker. We considered the traditional IDS in addition to intrusion prevention techniques using deception (i.e., a honeypot) and MTD (i.e., platform migration). Through the evaluation of the developed SPN model, we evaluated the impact of each defense technique in terms of attack and defense performance and investigated the interplay between different defense techniques. Based on the findings from this study, the integrated defense system with the three defense techniques, including IDS, MTD, and deception, performs the best in terms of prolonging the system lifetime (i.e., MTTSF) while minimizing the attack success. In addition, we found that attack performance (e.g., attack success and attack cost) is significantly affected by the defense techniques used by a system. From the demonstrated results, we conclude that the integrated defense system can maximize the system performance and security based on the interplay of defense mechanisms and cost-effective defense techniques. In addition, we observe that the contribution of adding an additional defense technique to security and performance is not linear. This implies that a defense system can maximize its performance and security while reducing the defense cost depending on how to integrate defense techniques.
As for future work directions, we plan to conduct the following research items: (1) enhance reward functions used to measure performance metrics considering cost details of attack and defense actions such as communication or computational overhead; (2) identify an optimal setting in terms of an optimal deception or MTD placement that meets both minimum defense cost (or maximum attack cost) and maximum MTTSF (or minimum attack success); and (3) validate the proposed model based on various scenarios through comprehensive sensitivity analysis.
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